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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

VIA: ATR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

DI. FCH NO. EGMA-9689

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

DATE: 3. Feb. 1984

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

ATTN: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AECUOR/Operational

INFO: COM

SPECIFIC— Utilization of an Established Mail Channel

REF: A. MUNI-6371
B. EGMA-238

05 APR 1982

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3/3
3 (dummy)

1. On the basis of information received, indicated in paragraph 3E, reference A, AECAMBISTA 2 was queried further on this matter to ascertain the veracity of his statements. It was learned that his previous hesitancy was entirely due to the fact that he did not desire to involve or endanger Identity A's friends and relatives knowing that the issue of Team II cleanliness has not yet been resolved.

2. The Identity A-Identity B channel was originally established in 1946 and has been used with considerable regularity since. They have corresponded with each other approximately once every three-four months. AECAMBISTA 2 is not acquainted with the details concerning the manner in which it was established or whether or not the intermediary in Poland has been used continuously since the channel was originally established in 1946. After our queries, made on 12 January 1954, AECAMBISTA 2 reapproached Identity A to obtain additional details but was generally unsuccessful except to gain the latter's assent to include some material in the next letter for transmittal to [REDACTED] AECAMBISTA 2 will have his wife attempt to procure the letter for examination.

3. In elaboration of paragraph 3E, reference A, Identity A is unwilling to release the identity of the person in Poland who receives his letters, recopies them and remails them to Identity B, a resident of the village of STAROYEL'NI (near NOVGRUDOK). This undisclosed source in Poland likewise is the recipient of letters from Identity B; these letters are rewritten (from Byelorussian into Polish) and then sent on to Identity A in Belgium. The purpose behind this arrangement being attributable to the greater risk inherent to the recipient within Byelorussia in receiving letters from the West than from Poland. Similarly the scrutiny of letters emanating from Poland is allegedly less stringent than for correspondence emanating from the Byelorussian SSR.

4. AECAMBISTA 2 only knows that Identity F is the sister of Identity A's wife and that Identity B is married to a sausage maker in STAROYEL'NI. The undisclosed source in Poland is presumed to be a close relative of the two sisters. Because STAROYEL'NI is located near NOVGRUDOK, [REDACTED] (or his wife) has been in contact with Identity B although it is not known how the former was able to learn that the latter maintains contact with friends in the West. AECAMBISTA 2 was unable to explain the nature of their relationship or to determine how

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Identity B and [] may have established their original contact. It is of interest to note that although the channel has been in existence since 1946 no attempt was made by AECAVADOR 1 to make use of the channel until the recent letter received by Identity A on approximately 23 December 1953.

5. The significance of this contact is unknown except that it is inconceivable that [] (or his wife) would make any inquiries about AECAMBISTA 2's wife knowing that this action may attract the censor's attention thereby compromising not only themselves but AECAMPOSANTO 6 and the team members as well. If, however, Team II is controlled it again appears inconceivable that the putative controllers would have any need to establish contact with AECAMBISTA 2 (or his wife) through such devious and roundabout channels. On the other hand, if the team inside is uncontrolled it is not known why [] assuming he was willing to take the above risk, had any reason to make queries about his daughter knowing, through AECAMPOSANTO 6, that she is safe, living in Belgium, ad infinitum.

6. AECAMBISTA 2, since receipt of the aforementioned letter, had a photograph taken of his two children and asked his wife to write a letter to her parents. Both of these have been transmitted to Identity A for enclosure in the next letter to Identity B. Both the letter and a message on the rear of the photograph were written by AECAMBISTA 2's wife; this will permit comparison of the actual letter received by [] with that of the handwriting on the photograph. The letter to Identity B, via the undisclosed source in Poland, was mailed on approximately 24 January 1954. Although the contents of the letter and the writing on the photograph were couched in innocuous terms and although both were unsigned, AECAMBISTA 2 is certain that [] will be able to recognize the identity of the writer. Within the letter AECAMBISTA 2's wife hinted that she would like to hear more frequently from her parents, if possible, in an attempt to establish a direct channel.

7. The meaning of the original inquiries or the value of the above is difficult to determine at this time. It is believed, however, that exploitation of the above channel may give us an additional means of ascertaining Team II's cleanliness. Therefore, in approximately one or one and one half months from the date on which the letter was mailed, AECAMPOSANTO 6 can be requested to contact [] and identify the items received from the West. If correctly identified, in another contact he can be requested to compare the handwriting specimens on the photograph and on the letter to determine whether or not the letter written by AECAMBISTA 2's wife was transmitted directly or whether it was rewritten by the person in Poland. If it was transmitted without having been rewritten, it is conceivable that we will have an established channel which can be used for S/W purposes from the West into the BSSR. Similarly, in order to establish an S/W channel in the other direction, it is possible that we will be able to instruct the undisclosed source in Poland to re-insert the contents of Identity B's letter into a new envelope without recopying the entire contents and translating it into Polish. This would permit us to instruct Team II to have AECAMPOSANTO 6 thereby offering us an opportunity to use the channel for S/W purposes. Any variant of the above could be worked out after we learn from AECAMPOSANTO 6 whether or not the letter received by [] is the one mailed by AECAMBISTA 2's wife or whether it was recopied.

8. In view of the fact that only a limited number of blind broadcast dates were furnished by the team as indicated in reference B, it may be necessary to instruct AECAMPOSANTO 6 re the identification of the contents on the 16 February

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blind broadcast or to designate additional blind broadcast dates ourselves for this purpose. The security aspects have been examined and it has been concluded that no one will be compromised, assuming the team is controlled, that has not already been compromised. If clean, a certain risk will be run but no greater than already exists.

1 February 1954

Attachment: Identity List (Under Separate Cover)

Distribution:

- 3 - SR (w/Att.) (SC) DIRECT
- 1 - EE (w/o Att.) DUMMY COPY
- 3 - COM (w/l Att.)
- 2 - COM (w/l Att.)

CS COPY

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Separate Cover Attachment to EGMA-9689

Identity List

Identity A - SMARTCEK

Identity B - ZHELEZOWSKA, fmu

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